Saturday, June 18, 2011

Nepal update (June 18, 2011)

1) In IDSA, we have this comment on how its all the same-old even after weeks of agreement on extension: Linky

However, till date, no progress has been seen as far as implementation of the five-point agreement is concerned. Rather, the concerned parties have started interpreting the clauses of the agreement on their own. The clauses are ambiguous and lack clarity and detail on crucial issues. For instance, Clause 1 of the agreement states that “basic tasks related to the peace process will be concluded.” There is no precision about what “basic tasks” means. According to the Maoists, Clause 1 is related only to the issues of management of its combatants, removing the dual security provision of its leadership, and in reaching an agreement on the modality of integration. Clause 1, as per the Maoists, deals with the number of combatants to be integrated, the ranks of the combatants after integration, the rehabilitation package, and the regrouping of combatants. But, the Nepali Congress (NC) and other non-Maoist parties link this clause with other issues such as surrendering of arms to the state, returning the seized property to the owners, dismantling the Maoist’s paramilitary force (the Youth Communist League), etc. Also, there is party-wise and individual-wise interpretation about when the Prime Minister must resign, and who would lead the country after his resignation.

And more:

The three major parties have agreed to form a State Restructuring Commission (SRC) to recommend the model of federation. However, the decision has not materialised as yet. There is speculation that the Maoists, the NC and the CPN-UML may agree to promulgate a new constitution without declaring the form of the federal set-up. Rather, they would agree to have a federation only after the recommendation of the SRC. On the contrary, Madhesi parties and ethnic organisations, doubting the intention of the three major parties, have said that they will not allow promulgation of the new constitution without a clear-cut provision on federation.

Also, the issue of mass integration of Madhesi youth into the Nepal Army seems to have complicated Nepal’s political transition. Though no numbers are mentioned in the recent agreement, Madhesi parties are demanding that 10,000 Madhesi youth should be given a chance to join the Nepal Army. This agenda will be initially backed by those who oppose Maoist combatants’ integration, thus complicating the integration issue. Eventually, all hill people including the Maoists are likely to oppose the proposal to integrate Madhesis in the army, though the move will help the army become an inclusive institution.

Concludes with a stark warning:

As a consequence, it is likely that the achievements of the Janaandolan-II would be endangered. Also, ethnic violence in the hill and Tarai areas is likely to spread. In fact, it will lead to chaos, which will further intensify youth migration towards India and the Middle East as happened during the Maoist’s “people’s war”.

2) Prashant Jha has this a bit of an optimistic take with which I will have to disagree quite vehemently, but in any case: Linky

A fortnight after Nepal's Constituent Assembly's term was extended for three months, there is good news from Kathmandu. All parties have shown a degree of urgency and seriousness, which was missing in the past two-and-a-half years. The peace process, largely understood as settling the future of Maoist combatants through a process of integration into security organs and rehabilitation into society, is finally moving forward. And the political class has been mature enough not to immediately get into another round of wrangling for power, but focus on the bigger picture.

But there is a caveat. Difficult decisions regarding the details of the peace process have yet to be taken. The same urgency is not quite visible in the constitution-drafting exercise. And a new power-sharing arrangement will have to be worked out at some point. All of this is complicated by the inner divisions within the Maoists, the key driver of the process.
...
However, another party vice-chairman Mohan Vaidya “Kiran” and his supporters kept the PLA fighters meant for their security and refused to turn in the weapons. Mr. Kiran, who represents the dogmatic faction in the party, alleged that this was tantamount to “surrender” and has now put forth an 18-point criticism of the party chairman accusing him of betraying the revolution.
...
Here is the dilemma for the decision-makers. If handouts are high, the incentives for combatants to opt for rehabilitation packages and even integration diminish. But donors are unwilling to underwrite direct monetary transfer since they fear that a part of the money will go straight to the Maoist party; this will also set a wrong precedent. This is a fear shared by many non-Maoists. On the other hand, if the golden handshake amount is not appealing, Maoist combatants may ask for integration in greater numbers — which will complicate the overall deal. Special Committee members are learnt to be working on a compromise formula which will encourage combatants to opt for rehabilitation and skills training, and transfer a limited amount of money to them in instalments.

3) More on the dissension within the maoist ranks: Linky
4) Elsewhere, ToI sensationalizes the diplomat issue, as usual: Linky

China's new ambassador to Nepal, Yang Houlan, arrived in Kathmandu on Saturday, triggering speculation by the local media that Beijing was beginning a new innings in the Himalayan republic, elevating it as a priority country in the scheme of Chinese foreign affairs.
...
Three of his predecessors, Sun Heping, Zheng Xianglin and Qiu Guohong had seen an escalation in anti-China protests in Nepal by Tibetan protesters and had not been able to stop them despite urging the government of Nepal to take stern action against the protesters.
...
With India also having named Special Secretary (Public Diplomacy) in the External Affairs Ministry, Jayant Prasad, as the new ambassador to Nepal, the Nepali media has begun speculating that in the days to come, with both its giant neighbours according priority to Nepal, the tiny republic could become a helpless yam squeezed between two boulders.

5) This yam type alliterative comparisons come straight from the insecure Nepali media from which ToI must have sourced this commentary. Actually, I can point out the exact article which came up with the yam comment: Linky

The ground reality that Nepal is a yam between two boulders is uncontestable. Its location is uniquely strategic viewed through the lens of security of India and China, Nepal’s neighbors to the south and north. Since both of them have acquired enviable significance wielding power to influence global agenda, the conduct of a prudent neighborhood policy for Nepal has become a Herculean task.

6) Writing on India's Economic Miracle and its Impact on Nepal, Haribansh Jha has this to say: Linky

Significantly, India’s share in total direct investment in Nepal accounts for 45%. Some of the major joint ventures with India in Nepal include Surya Nepal - a joint venture with ITC India, Dabur Nepal, Nepal Lever and United Telecom Nepal, Everest Bank, SBI Bank, LIC Nepal, Asian Paints, GMR India, IL&FS and Manipal.

Considering the growing demand for power both in Nepal and in India, Satluj Hydro Electric Project of India has made investment for the construction of 402 MW in Arun III. On the other hand, GMR, an Indian infrastructure developer has made investment for the construction of 300 MW Upper Karnali at Tunibagar in Dailekh district. Also, Himtal Hydropower Company Pvt Ltd (in which GMR has 80 per cent share and the Nepalese have 20% share) has made investment for the construction of 600 MW Upper Marshyangdi-II hydropower. IL&FS has 15 per cent share in 750 MW West Seti project. Besides, the Indian government has also offered to construct 240 MW Naumure project under its grant assistance.

Indian investment has given Nepal access to new technologies and management skills. It also generated substantial revenues to the national exchequer. Besides, it promoted import substitution and exports of Nepalese goods to the Indian market. More significantly, about 30,000 Nepalese have been provided direct employment and twice this number have got indirect employment in various industries run through Indian investment. Bilateral trade between Nepal and India doubled to US $ 4 billion during last five years. Credit for the surge in trade between the two countries largely goes to the treaty of trade signed between Nepal and India in 1996.[7] There is provision of preferential treatment for the Nepalese products in India at par with the Indian producers.

More on how the Indian investor thinks:

There have been reports of diversion of third country goods from Nepal to India during the transit. Perhaps, affixation of an additional one time lock by Indian customs could resolve this problem, but it is not getting materialized. Besides, there is growing practice of copying the popular Indian brands and trademarks by certain unscrupulous Nepalese manufacturers. Such activity has eroded the reputation of the Indian brand. Besides, this created doubts in the minds of the Indian investors about the nature of fragile legal framework of Nepal in regard to the protection of intellectual property. This prevented the Nepalese consumers from getting quality goods from India. Some of the Indian business community also grudge that there is erosion in the margin of preference by the Nepalese government on import of goods from India.

There are reports that many of the Indian investors have already started deserting the country as they feel that they have had to face certain tariff and non-tariff barriers and that they were being discriminated in the country in different ways. Some Indian companies who have made investment in Nepal feel that they were trapped as the concerned Nepalese wings hardly fulfilled their obligations made during the time of agreement. Meanwhile, certain forces have mixed up politics with economics and obstructed the implementation of different development projects, including the hydro-power projects undertaken by India in Nepal. Because of the negative perception of Indian companies, no new Indian investment has made their entry into Nepal since 2003 when Indian companies at the global level have made a commitment to make investment to the tune of US$ 70 billion. All this led to the decline in investment, production and exports of goods resulting into deficit in balance of trade with India and affecting the economic growth of the country as a whole.

Now who stands to lose more by endangering India-Nepal relations? Even the most viscerally India-baiting maoists understand that there is a rubicon to be crossed and life will not go on as usual after that. So, for fellow ToI newswaalons, relax and have a chai-biskoth.

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Saturday, June 11, 2011

Chittagong 10-truck arms haul case: A primer

Incident: Police seized 10 truckloads of weapons and ammunition from a jetty of the Chittagong Urea Fertiliser Ltd (CUFL) on the night of Apr 1, 2004, sparking speculation that the cache was destined for the Indian insurgent group, United Liberation Front of Assam (Ulfa). This has been the largest arms haul in Bangladesh's history bulky enough to equip an army brigade. Estimated at US $4.5-5.7 million, the seizure in the ten trucks included: rocket launchers (150), rockets (840), over a million rounds of ammunition, grenade launchers (2000), grenades (25,000), and over 1700 assorted assault weapons.
Source: Linky

Brief summary of current status of the case:
Current state counsel/Public prosecutor -- Kamal Uddin Ahmed
Current investigating officer (IO) -- Mohammad Moniruzzaman Chowdhury, also assistant superintendent of police (ASP) of Chittagong circle

The following have been charge-sheeted as of today:
1) Former industries minister and Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami chief -- Matiur Rahman Nizami
2) Former state minister for home -- Lutfozzaman Babar
3) Former director general of NSI -- Brig Gen (retd) Abdur Rahim
4) Former director of DGFI who was later appointed as director general of NSI -- Maj Gen (retd) Rezzakul Haider Chowdhury
5) Former director of NSI -- Wing Cdr Shahabuddin Ahmed
6) Former deputy director (technical) of NSI -- Maj (retd) Liakat Hossain
7) Former field officer of NSI -- Akbar Hossain Khan
8) Former acting industries secretary -- Nurul Amin (absconding)
9) Former managing director of CUFL -- Mohsin Uddin Talukdar
10) Former general manager (admin) of CUFL -- Enamul Haque
11) ULFA leader -- Poresh Borua (absconding)

FAQs:
1) Who was the shipment intended for?: In its investigative story, the defence journal Jane’s Intelligence Review (JIR) had squarely held ULFA leader Paresh Barua and the NSCN-IM chief procurement officer Anthony Shimray (now arrested by NIA) responsible for this arms trafficking incident.

2) NSCN-IM and ULFA bonhomie?!: NSCN-IM had been talking with the Government of India from 1997-98 on ending the stalement of Naga "sovreignty." Peace talks with the GoI chief representative Padmanabaiah in Bangkok and Amsterdam had made virtually no progress at all, largely due to the NSCN-IM's insistence on the recognition by New Delhi of 'Nagalim' or a Greater Nagaland. Even a meeting with PM Atal Bihari Vajpayee was not sufficient to give further impetus to the talks. NSCN-IM had been fearing a return to war-like ways and thus wanted to bolster its capacity to sustain an armed onslaught.

Traditionally, ties between ULFA and the NSCN-IM have been strained, and ULFA has cultivated far better links with NSCN-IM's rival NSCN-K based in the remote border areas of Myanmar's Sagaing Division. However, following the severe setbacks suffered by ULFA as a result of Operation All Clear in Bhutan in December 2003, a new entente has developed. One intelligence official noted: "The NSCN and ULFA were working this jointly. The NSCN has better contracts in the arms trade while ULFA has the money and the foreign political connections."

3) It could nt have happened without any top involvement, no?!: The Bangladeshi media has drawn attention to the complicity of the BNP coalition government’s involvement in this incident. There were allegations of Salauddin Quader Chowdhury, BNP leader as well as Jamaat-e-Islami leader, being largely responsible for overseeing the transfer at the CUFL jetty from two fishing trawlers (“MV Orient Freedom” and “QC Honour”) both vessels owned by his Queen Shipping Lanes. The arms shipments from Teknaf on the Myanmar-Bangladesh border was brought to Chittagong port.

The Sunday Guardian claims that based on Hafizur Rahman's confessional statement, in the BNP, the involvement goes all the way up to Tareque Rahman (Begum Khaleda Zia's eldest son). A part of the arms haul that managed to evade on Apr 1 was promptly seized on Apr 26, 2004 was taken to the Feni police station. It was, however, released following the
intervention of a retired army Major who also is a senior BNP leader. And under his instructions, the police escorted the bus with its cargo upto Chhagalnaiya from where the consignment was to be smuggled across the border into Tripura. Investigators identify the ‘leader’ as Syed Iskander, a brother of Begum Khaleda Zia.

The confessional statement of Hafizur also includes the names of Golam Faruq Obhi, a former Jatiya Party MP (who belonged to the Zia-led alliance) and Azmal Huda Mithu, a film director. Sahab Uddin in his confessional statement said that a foreign intelligence agency was involved in offloading the arms and ammunitions while an UAE-based firm was involved in supplying the arms. It is now clear that Abdul Razzak Yaqub, the Dubai-based ARY group owner financed the operation at the behest of ISI-D (Washington Post says the ARY group is associated with the ISI and al Qaeda and is involved in smuggling of gold and the greenback. ARY’s linkage with al Qaeda was confirmed in 1998 following the bombing of US mission in Nairobi.) whereas senior officials of the Pakistani High Commission (PHC) in Dhaka were able to mediate the logistics with DGFI and NSI. According to Wg Cdr (Retd) Sahabuddin's confession that was admitted (May 9-14, 2009), the involvement of Shahid Mahmood, a Counselor and Brig Gen Moghis Uddin, Defense Attaché was confirmed. According to him, four top functionaries: Brig Gen (Retd) Abdur Rahim, Brig Gen A. S Shaukat, Brig Gen Wasim, Sqn Ldr Didar and Maj Liaqat had held series of talks with the Mahmood and Uddin on planning and execution of arms delivery to ULFA and NSCN-IM.

The arms were procured from the Chinese state-run arms factory North Industries Corporation (NORINCO), according to a report published in a Bengali newspaper 'Prothom Alo' paraphrasing confidential files. Chinese arms shipment is not a new thing. B. Raman in his book "Kaoboys of Raw" mentions of contact between NE-based terrorist outfits and the Chinese establishment in the 60s and 70s.

4) Why Chittagong?: The original idea, according to JIR sources, was to transport the munitions to NE India via a route across northern Myanmar's Kachin State. However, this idea was eventually shelved owing to security concerns over moving so large a shipment across territory where local Kachins were seen as pro-Indian.

5) Hafizur Rahman's version of what happened:
Before the October 2001 Parliament election, film director Ajmal Huda Mithu invited him (Hafiz) to a private event at his residence in Dhaka, and introduced him to the former Jatiya Party MP, Golam Faruk Obhi, and another man named Zaman (Poresh Borua). Zaman kept contact with him over the phone since then.

Fifteen days later, Hafiz got a phone call from Zaman, and he met him and the MP in a fast food shop, Wimpy, in Dhaka. He agreed to help Zaman in receiving and transporting ‘imports’ the latter quite often used to get at the Chittagong port. After several months, Zaman called Hafiz over the phone again and met him on the third floor of Rapa Plaza in Dhaka some time in January 2002 and they talked business. Since then, Zaman was paying Hafiz taka 50,000 to 70,000 a month, the statement claimed. At one stage of the increasing intimacy, Zaman invited Hafiz to his residence in Dhanmondi of Dhaka. In his apartment, Zaman introduced Hafiz to his wife, two children, Babu and Aaksah, and an adopted son. He also gave Hafiz taka 80,000 at that time.

After paying some taka 18 lakh in this way, Zaman finally called Hafiz to Dhaka to reveal his real identity in February 2004. “As I met him in Rapa Plaza, Zaman this time around had with him a girl of about 10. He revealed himself as ULFA military wing chief, Paresh Barua, and the girl as the daughter of Anup Chetia,” said Hafiz in his confession. Anup Chetia, one of the top ULFA leaders, was arrested in Bangladesh in 1996 and is believed to be in prison since then. “Zaman or Paresh Barua also claimed that he looked after Anup’s family, while some people of intelligence agencies ensured their safety,” Hafiz said, the newspapers reported. “On March 23 or 24, Paresh called for me on an emergency basis. I immediately rushed to Dhaka and rented a room in Red Star Hotel opposite Rajarbagh Police Line, and met him at Wimpy again. Paresh asked me to help him to transport a delivery of some machinery from a ship anchored in the sea near the Myanmar border near Saint Martin's Island. He said the goods could not be brought to Chittagong port due to some technical problems. Asked about the required permission from the Bangladesh Navy, the Coast Guard, the customs authority, and the CUFL jetty authority, he said the NSI and DGFI chiefs had made all arrangements, and the jetty permission had also already been there, so nobody would ask me any question,” said Hafiz.

“I returned to the hotel and went to the same restaurant again early next morning. After some fifteen minutes, Paresh came with another person in a white car which had ‘on test’ written on the registration plate. The man with Paresh was introduced to me as Ashik. He gave me 50 lakh taka in four packets. Then Ashik and I went to Chittagong in the same car. Leaving Ashik in Golden Inn hotel in Chittagong I went to meet Hazi Sobhan, and rented two engine boats for around 13 lakh taka. Sobhan was to keep the engine boats ready near the Marine Academy pier. Around 10.30 that night a vessel came to our view. We approached the vessel and following directions given by Paresh, Ashik started talking to the captain in English. Following exchange of some codes which sounded like passwords, Ashik was allowed to anchor the boats next to the other vessel.” Three others, including Ashik and Jewel, took delivery of the arms cache from a ship near Saint Martin’s Island, loaded two engine boats with the weapons and guided them up to the jetty of the government-owned Chittagong Urea Fertilizer Limited (CUFL) across the Karnaphuli river.

6) Why CUFL jetty in Chittagong?: Paresh Baruah put pressure on Tarique Rahman to change the venue of the unloading of arms from the Chittagong harbour jetty to the CUFL jetty as he did not trust the port workers' chief bargaining agent, ABM Mohiuddin Choudhury, who was an Awami League leader and city mayor. CUFL was safe as it was under the industries ministry headed by BNP coalition partner Matiur Rahman Nizami.

7) How did the capture happen?: Former police sergeants Mohammad Alauddin and Helal Uddin were in-charge of coal depot under Karnaphuli Police Station at the time of arms seizure. They were the first ones to see the unloading of the arms and they also first informed the high police officials of the incident. Prothom Alo reported the interrogation of the Police Officials who actually caught the truck load of arms. They were subsequently thrown off their jobs and were threatened to be killed in “Crossfire”. The alleged people who issued the threats was Chief of RAB (Rapid Action Batalion) – 7.

Many theories are floating on who might have tipped off the police. One theory says that a "foreign" (read Indian) intelligence agency tipped off law enforcement. One other theory from CID officials says that infighting among NSI officials may have been responsible for the 'tip-off'. Another simplistic theory is that the operation for smuggling in 10 truckloads of arms was botched as policemen on duty, unaware of the orders from high authorities, challenged the consignment and upon finding arms, placed the seizure on record.

8) A case history: Note that
NSI = National Security Intelligence
DGFI = Directorate General of Forces Intelligence
CUFL = Chittagong Urea Fertiliser Limited

June 27, 2003: In an earlier, significant arms haul, in the northwestern Bogra district, the police recover 100,000 cartridges and about 200 kg of explosives from an abandoned truck. The truck owner - Jogesh Dev Barman, a top leader of the Tripura Cooperatives Association, a front organization of the All Tripura Tiger Force (ATTF) - is arrested from the southeastern border district of Habibganj.

Apr 3, 2004: Two cases are filed with Karnaphuli Police Station under section-25/B of the Special Powers Act for arms smuggling and section-19 (ka) of the Arms Act in connection with the arms haul. The first IO of the case is Ahadur Rahman, also the Officer-in-Charge (OC) of Karnaphuli Police Station. Police arrest five men engaged in unloading of the cache on the day. Later, they were taken to the arms warehouse at Dampara Police Lines in Chittagong in 10 trucks guarded by a huge contingent of police, coastguard and paramilitary BDR. 43 accused are named in the initial chargesheet.

Apr 26, 2004: CID starts probe into the case as Ahadur Rahman is dropped by the establishment fearing his investigation into the case. ASP AKM Kabir Uddin Ahmed of Chittagong zone is the second IO of the case.

Apr 26, 2004: Security agencies intercept a microbus with crates of small arms including pistols and SMGs and ammunition on the Feni-Belonia route, close to Tripura border. The cargo is camouflaged under cigarettes and watermelons. It is a part of the shipment that evaded detection in Chittagong on Apr 2, 2004. The shipment is released due to pressure from the top.

June 11, 2004: ASP Kabir Uddin and inspector Mohammad Shah Alam submit the charge sheet accusing 39 people in the arms-haul case to the court.

June 15, 2004: Metropolitan session judge Fazlul Karim, who conducted the hearing, finds huge discrepancies in the investigation process and observes differences in the mode of examination by the previous and present investigation officers.

The first IO Ahadur Rahman mentioned only five trucks in the seizure list though the huge amount of arms and ammunition were carried from CUFL jetty to Dampara police line by ten trucks. “The first IO found five trucks fully and two others partially loaded during the seizure but didn’t mention the whereabouts of the three missing trucks,” PP Advocate Abdus Sattar pleaded in the court. The judge wants to know from Kabiruddin as to why he failed to verify the missing of the three trucks and why he did not include the owner of Green Ways Transport Agency Habibur Rahman and his two accomplices in the chargesheet along with other accused or witnesses. Kabiruddin admitted in the court that due to time constraints he could not collect the addresses of the said trio, but he said that the names of those persons would be included in the supplementary chargesheet later on.
More at: Linky

Aug 21, 2004: A major grenade attack is carried out on an AL rally on Bangabandhu Avenue to assassinate Sheikh Hasina. A total of 24 people were killed and over 300 were maimed in the attack.

Aug 28, 2004: Following more investigation into the cases, another CID ASP Nowsher Ali of Sylhet Zone (third IO) submits the supplementary charge sheet to the court.

Oct 24, 2004: The Metropolitan Sessions Judge’s Court frames charges.

Oct 26, 2005: Hafizur Rahman, the prime accused in the case, is arrested after he surrenders before the High Court.

Late 2005 - Late 2006: Begum Khaleda Zia-led coalition government appoints a five-member inquiry committee headed by Home Secretary Omar Farooque (other members include Brig Gen. Rezzakul Hyder Chowdhury (now charge-sheeted), Brig Gen Enamur Rahman Chowdhury, a former DG of NSI, Shamsul Islam, DIG Special Branch, and Faruque Ahmad, DIG of CID) to probe the incident. However, this committee did not make public any of its findings.

Jan 11, 2007: A military controlled caretaker government under Dr. Fakhruddin Ahmed takes office on the pretext of stymying the chaos that preceded this date. It is without legislative authority as it continued to function after its scheduled tenure of 120 days ended on 12 May 2007.

Jan 29, 2007: Din Mohammad, another prime accused in the case, is arrested after he surrendered before a Chittagong court.

Out of the 43 accused in the initial charge-sheet, only Hafizur Rahman (a smuggler) and Din Mohammad, who were allegedly involved with the arms smuggling, were behind bars while 33 were on bail and eight others are on the run. Names of two accused were later dropped from the chargesheet as they died.

Hafizur Rahman, who is the principal accused in the case, told the court that he had given the same statement that was later used to charge-sheet 11 major people on different occasions since his surrender in 2005. But it was never recorded. Instead, the officials concerned warned him against making such statements and threatened him with death, a number of leading Bangladesh dailies reported quoting Hafiz’s statement.

Nov 19, 2007: Assistant Public Prosecutor (APP) Humayun Kabir Russell files an appeal saying it could not be ruled out that the weapons and ammunition came from a ship at the outer anchorage of Chittagong port and then loaded on vessels. It is important to know the names of all the vessels that were at the outer anchorage of the port at that time, their import manifests and Onward Customs Declaration they made in Singapore, the APP said. Logs of the vessels should have been looked into and the speed of the vessels should have been figured out to know how much time they took to reach the outer anchorage of Chittagong port from Singapore. A number of the hauled arms and ammunition went missing from the custody of the law enforcers. Two police sergeants were held in this connection and three of the missing firearms were recovered, said the APP in the appeal. The previous two IOs made no investigation into these things, he observed.

Feb 12, 2008: During the tenure of the army-backed caretaker government, Dhaka metropolitan sessions judge ANM Bashirullah directs for further inquiry and fresh (a second time) investigation into the cases in response to an appeal from the state counsel Ahsanul Haque Hena. The court observes that the previous two IOs did not investigate deep into the case or mention anything about who brought the firearms, the place of shipment and their destinations. The police authorities appoint CID's assistant superintendent of police (ASP) Ismail Hossain Khan of Gazipur zone as the IO of the cases. Six months time is given to submit the report.

Aug 18, 2008: First extension provided for 150 days. Report due Jan 18, 2009.

Dec 29, 2008: Fresh elections are held under the Caretaker government formed with Dr. Fakhruddin Ahmed as the Chief Adviser. A record 80% turnout is observed.

Jan 5, 2009: AL wins the elections held on Dec 29, 2008 winning 263 of 300 seats in the Jotiyo Songsad and takes office.

Jan 18, 2009: Ismail Hossain Khan fails to submit report on the case even after six extensions. In response to an appeal of the state counsel, the court directs to change the IO on the basis of seven observations. This time Mohammad Moniruzzaman Chowdhury, also assistant superintendent of police (ASP) of Chittagong circle, is made the fifth IO of the case. Report due May 13, 2009.

Mar 4, 2009: Hafizur Rahman and Din Mohammad, in their confessional statement to the court clearly refer to the role of the chiefs of the Directorate General of Forces Intelligence (DGFI) and National Security Intelligence (NSI) in the shipment and handling of the arms cache. Rahman's confession before Metropolitan Magistrate Md Mahabubur Rahman is recorded in 43 pages.

Mar 12, 2009: CUFL former MD Mohsin Talukder and GM (admn) Enamul Haq are shown arrested after CUFL former security officer Mobin Hossain Khan in a statement said that he duly informed the MD of the deadly consignment. But the MD did not give any instruction to check the offloading.

Mar 17, 2009: The CUFL former MD Mohsin Talukder and former GM (administration) Enamul Haq are placed on a three-day remand each. The former CUFL officials are reportedly not cooperating with the investigators during questioning. They are arrested after former CUFL assistant security officer made a statement before a magistrate on March 12.

Mar 31, 2009: CID filed a case against three of its former investigators in connection with intentionally misdirecting the probe into the August 21 grenade attack case on Sheikh Hasina. IO Fazlur Kabir said that they destroyed evidence and did not record the confessional statements of the culprits, including outlawed Islamist militant outfit Harkatul Jihad al Islami (Huji) leader Mufti Hannan, who admitted his involvement. Hannan confessed to his involvement in the grenade attack and disclosed names of 27 others who were directly and indirectly involved in the planning and execution of the attack on the Awami League (AL) rally. The names include former BNP deputy minister Abdus Salam Pintu. Through multiple investigations, the BNP-led alliance government tried to establish that the AL itself killed its own leaders and activists to tarnish the image of the BNP-led government. They also tried to prove that "foreign enemies" instigated the carnage and some listed criminals absconding in India had executed the attack.

Apr 12, 2009: Habibur Rahman and Taslim Mallick (owner and manager of Greenways Transport Agency whose truck was used in transporting the arms) give statements before the Court of Metropolitan Magistrate that NSI field officer Akbar Hossain Khan hired the 10 trucks that were supposed to carry the arms and ammunition seized at the CUFL jetty. They say that NSI field officer hired the trucks from them saying he would transport salt.

Apr 19, 2009: The CID arrest NSI field officer Akbar Hossain Khan for allegedly hiring the 10 trucks following the statements of Habibur Rahman and Taslim Mallick. He is also placed on a two-day remand after his arrest. Following the transport agency owners' statements the investigators interrogate Akbar Hossain as well as Assistant Director (AD) Mohammad Ali Chowdhury of NSI Gulshan circle (the then AD of NSI, Chittagong) at the CID Chittagong divisional headquarters in Dampara Police Lines. Since Akbar Hossain continues to deny his involvement in the matter Habibur Rahman is brought in to identify him as the person who hired the trucks. Sources say arrested NSI field officer Akbar Hossain Khan, now serving as a field officer at NSI Gulshan circle, reportedly hired the 10 trucks under the fake name of NSI field officer 'Abul Hossain' to carry the deadly weapons.

On the same day, the investigators also produce former CUFL MD and GM before a Chittagong court with a prayer for five-day fresh remand for each in connection with the case. The court places Mohsin on two days' fresh remand and permits investigators to interrogate Enamul at the jail gate.

May 3, 2009: Former director (Security) NSI Sahab Uddin is arrested in the capital's Green Road, following the statement of Akbar Hossain, for his alleged involvement in arranging transport and equipment for carrying the illegal arms and ammunition. Sahab Uddin, a wing commander of Bangladesh Air Force who joined the NSI on deputation, went into voluntary retirement soon after the arms haul. Detained NSI field officer Akbar Hossain Khan in a confessional statement before a magistrate said he hired seven trucks and a crane from Greenways for carrying the arms and ammunition on orders of Sahab Uddin.

May 13, 2009: Third extension provided for 70 days. Report due July 22, 2009. Chittagong Metropolitan Sessions Judge -- Bhabani Prashad Singha.

May 16, 2009: The CID arrests two former director generals (DG) of the NSI-- Maj Gen (retd) Rezaqul Haider Chowdhury and Brig Gen (retd) Abdur Rahim Chowdhury -- at their DOHS residences at Mohakhali in the capital in connection with the 10-truck arms haul case. The arrests are made following the confessional statements by former NSI director Sahab Uddin and arrested NSI Field Officer Akbar Hossain Khan. According to sources, during the arms haul in Chittagong Abdur Rahim was DG of the NSI while Rezaqul Haider was director of the DGFI. Rezaqul Haider also served as DG of NSI later.

July 23, 2009: Fourth extension provided for 75 days. Report due Oct 5, 2009. Chittagong Metropolitan Sessions Judge -- Bhabani Prashad Singha.

Oct 5, 2009: Fifth extension provided for 90 days. Report due Jan 4, 2010. Chittagong Metropolitan Sessions Judge -- Bhabani Prashad Singha.

Oct 26, 2009: Lutfozzaman Babar is accused in the grisly grenade attack case on AL on Aug 21, 2004.

Jan 4, 2010: Sixth extension provided for 75 days. Report due Mar 22, 2010. Chittagong Metropolitan Sessions Judge -- Bhabani Prashad Singha.

Mar 22, 2010: Seventh extension provided for 60 days. Report due May 22, 2010.

May 23, 2010: Eighth extension provided for 63 days. Report due July 26, 2010.

July 26, 2010: Ninth extension provided for 60 days. Report due Sept 26, 2010. Acting Chittagong Metropolitan Sessions Judge -- Inamul Haque Bhuiyan.

Sept 26, 2010: Tenth extension provided for 60 days. Report due Nov 25, 2010. Chittagong Metropolitan Sessions Judge -- Inamul Haque Bhuiyan.

Oct 3, 2010: Former state minister for Home Lutfozzaman Babar shown arrested in the case. Metropolitan Magistrate Fazlul Bari passes the order for showing Babar arrested in the cases following a prayer from IO.

Oct 5, 2010: Former chairman of Bangladesh Chemical Industries Corporation (BCIC) Maj Gen Mohammad Imamuzzaman in a judicial statement before a Chittagong court states that Jamaat-e-Islami chief Matiur Rahman Nizami showed indifferent attitude to the seizure of 10-truck arms haul and ammunition. Nizami also asked the then BCIC chairman not to do anything since the home ministry was going to take steps regarding the incident.
Metropolitan magistrate Mahabubur Rahman records the testimony of 12 pages.

Nov 21, 2010: Eleventh extension provided for 90 days. Report due Feb 22, 2011. Acting Chittagong Metropolitan Sessions Judge -- Golam Sarwar.

Jan 27, 2011: A Chittagong Metropolitan Sessions Judge Shamsul Islam rejects the bail petition of detained former minister Lutfozzaman Babar.

Feb 22, 2011: IO seeks a 90 day extension which is denied by the Chittagong Sessions Judges' Court. However, later the same court granted a 35 day extension. Report due Mar 30, 2011.

Mar 30, 2011: Twelfth extension provided for 45 days. Report due May 15, 2011. Chittagong Metropolitan Session’s Judge -- AKM Shamsul Islam. IO submits a 409-page case docket in CD form.

May 4, 2011: Chittagong Metropolitan Magistrate Hussain Muhammad Fazlul Bari passes an order for showing Nizami arrested. Chargesheet says: Nizami was the then Industries Minister, he did not take any effective legal action in connection with the seizure of arms unloaded at the CUFL jetty, which was under the supervision of the ministry. As per the petition, Nizami's reluctance regarding the seizure of huge arms was also revealed in a statement given by Imamuzzaman.

May 15, 2011: Thirteenth extension provided for 45 days. Report due June 29, 2011. Chittagong Metropolitan Session’s Judge -- AKM Shamsul Islam.

June 4, 2011: CID claims to have solved six out of seven issues that a Chittagong court directed to solve during further investigation. The unsolved issue is identifying the vessel that transported the consignment.

June 29, 2011: CID report due

Unexplored connections:
1) ARY group -- al Qaeda -- smuggling of gold and greenback -- 1998 Nairobi bombings
2) ARY group -- World Memon Organisation -- ISI -- Government of Pakistan
3) ARY group -- ARY Bangladesh TV -- ISI -- Salauddin Qader Chowdhury -- BNP
4) Motiur Rahman Nizami -- CUFL
5) Salauddin Qader Chowdhury -- ISI -- Tareque Rahman -- BNP
6) ULFA -- NSCN-IM -- ISI -- NORINCO

Sources:
1) Linky 1
2) Linky 2
3) Linky 3
4) Linky 4
5) Linky 5
6) Linky 6
7) Linky 7
8) Linky 8

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Wednesday, June 8, 2011

Northeast terrorist and other updates

1) SS Khaplang ousted from NSCN(K): Linky

In a surprise development, the Naga militant organisation NSCN(K) has impeached and expelled its chairman S S Khaplang for removing the outfit’s armed wing chief and acting in an “autocratic” and “undemocratic” manner. Seen as a major development in Naga underground politics, the decision to expel Mr. Khaplang was taken yesterday at an emergency session of the ‘National Tatar Hoho’ (national assembly) of the underground outfit at its Khehoi designated camp near Dimapur, an NSCN(K) statement said. After ousting Mr. Khaplang, who is a Hemi Naga from Myanmar, the organisation’s national assembly nominated C—in—C ’Gen’ Kholi Konyak as the acting president of the “Government of the People’s Republic of Nagaland and acting chairman of NSCN.

The statement said the session was held to deliberate on the “unconstitutional” action of Mr. Khaplang, who without the consent and approval of the national assembly, removed widely respected Naga political figure ‘Gen’ Kholi Konyak from the post of C—in—C of the Naga army. Mr. Khaplang had also unilaterally filled up the vacant post of vice chairman in the NSCN, it alleged. The assembly denounced Mr. Khaplang’s “dictatorial” action ordering non-participation of NSCN(K) in the meeting of top leaders of Naga underground groups at Dimapur on September 18 last year and in all subsequent Naga re-conciliation meetings.

Elsewhere, Patricia Mukhim writes this: Linky

It is learnt that Muivah and other leaders of the NSCN (I-M) are currently consulting some of the best international minds, from Australia and the US among others, on setting out a template for negotiations with Delhi.

2) Tangkhul Naga-Meitei issues from SATP:

Sentinel reports that Naga Peoples’ Front (NPF) launched its party unit at Senapati town in Manipur on May 28. Thousands of Southern Nagas from the four hills districts of Senapati, Ukhrul, Tamenlong and Chandel congregated at public ground, Senapati, to witness the flag hoisting and declaration programme of the NPF Manipur unit. The NPF made a bold declaration that “integration” of Nagas is a birth right that cannot be negotiated at any cost. “Integration is our birth right, our fundamental right,’ declared NPF President Dr Shurhozelie Liezietsu. In the same breath, Nagaland Chief Minister Neiphiu Rio said that it is the duty of every Naga to have a feeling of ‘Pan Naga’ and that Nagas should be integrated “politically, emotionally, socially and culturally.”

Meanwhile, Times of India reports that The United National Liberation Front (UNLF) condemned the launching of Naga People's Front's Manipur unit by Chief Minister of Nagaland, Neiphiu Rio in Senapati District on May 31. The UNLF said setting up of an NPF unit in Manipur was a ploy to advance National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Isak-Muivah (NSCN-IM)’s agenda of disintegrating Manipur.

3) Strength of COIN and IS Ops:

"There were 541 Operational Bns of Central Armed Police Forces as on November 30, 2008. As on May 31, 2011, this number stands at 573. Besides, 21 Bns are being raised. The total strength of our Central Armed Police Forces including all ranks is 777,788," said Chidambaram.

Some more from SATP:

The Government has decided to recruit 20,000 more armed women personnel in Central Paramilitary Forces (CPMFs) in the next three to five years, reports Times of India on May 13. Women will comprise 5% of the total strength of each Armed Police Force, Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF), Border Security Force (BSF), Central Industrial Security Force (CISF), Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP), Sashastra Seema Bal (SSB) and National Security Guard (NSG) in three to five years and 10% in the subsequent five years. At present, women personnel comprise not even 1% of the total strength of all the CPMFs together.

And some more:

According to Times of India, a Police official, who interrogated Varanasi Subramanian, one of the three Central Committee members of the Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPI-Maoist) revealed that the Maoist leader confessed that outfit`s annual income by way of collecting levy from big companies and loot is to the tune of INR 400 billion. However, their annual budget stood at INR 200 billion per year, Subramanian reportedly told Police. About the mode of fund operations, the Police officer said the Maoists generally allotted one-third of the generated fund to the committee while two-third of the money is spent on payment of salary to cadres, purchasing arms and ammunition and meeting other exigencies. The money is allotted to the committee becomes part of the corpus fund and kept as reserve. ‘Zonal commanders’ handle the fund meant for the salary of the cadre members, purchase of arms, explosives and other expenditures. These commanders meet at regular intervals to update the accounts, the details of which are sent to the committee on regular basis, the police officer said.

And some more:

Assam Tribune reports that the Government of India initiated a series of mega plans for increasing vigil along the 4,095 kilometres international border with Bangladesh, which include raising of new battalions of the Border Security Force (BSF), creation of helicopter bases, creation of new frontier headquarters of the border guarding force, etc. The Inspector General (Operations) of the BSF, H Desai said that the process of raising 16 new battalions of the border guarding force has started and the new additions to the force would be used exclusively for increasing vigil along the international border with Bangladesh. He said that the process of raising of the new battalions is likely to be completed by the end of this year. Desai, who is holding additional charge of IG, Assam-Meghalaya frontier, said that the new battalions would be deployed in the vulnerable patches along the international border, including the riverine border areas. He said that the riverine international border in West Bengal, Assam, Mizoram and Tripura are considered most vulnerable and the other vulnerable patches along the border have also been identified for deployment of the forces to improve border management.

4) Lengpui forward base: Linky

The Indian Air Force will permanently station at least four combat jet fighters at Lengpui air-port, 38km from Aizawl, a strategically-placed state girdled by Myanmar and Bangladesh. The decision followed the clearance of the proposal to set up a hi-tech surveillance radar in southern Mizoram’s village of Zokhawtlang on the Indo-Myanmar border. Air Marshal K.K. Nohwar, the commander-in-chief of the Eastern Command of the IAF in Shillong, who was on a one-day trip to Mizoram on Thursday, discussed the prospect of an air force combat facility in Mizoram’s lone airport of Lengpui with chief minister Lalthanhawla at his residence that day. The airport at Lengpui is owned by the Mizoram government. At present, the IAF has combat facilities in the Northeast in airports such as as Shillong, Silchar, Chabua in Upper Assam and Tezpur.

5) NDFB pro-talks faction: Linky

The pro-talks faction of the NDFB today asked the Centre to replace the “bureaucrat” interlocutor with a political representative from the Prime Minister’s Office to ensure a “political” solution to the Bodo problem.

The bureaucrat interlocutor is of course P.C.Haldar. The moment when someone wants PMO to intercede, it means the chai-biskoth sessions are going on fine. Elsewhere, Linky

The Dima Halam Daogah (Jewel Gorlosa) has sought a hike in the subsistence allowance provided to it by the Centre, alleging discrimination. In a memorandum, which was submitted to chief minister Tarun Gogoi on Monday and released to the media today, the outfit states that it is given Rs 15 lakh per month as subsistence allowance to take care of the daily expenses of more than 400 cadres lodged in three designated camps, while Ulfa is given Rs 40 lakh per month for 300 cadres staying in one designated camp.

6) Border talks with BD: Linky

Bangladesh has agreed to India’s request for relaxation of rules to set up defence installations on the 150-square metres no-man’s land. During recent discussions about the management of the no-man’s land held in Shillong, Agartala, Calcutta, Dhaka and New Delhi, the Bangladesh authorities agreed to relax such rules and allow the Indian officials to set up the barbed wire fencing on at least 14 border points along Bangladesh.

From SATP:

Tripura Chief Minister Manik Sarkar on May 9 asked the Border Security Forces (BSF) authority to complete the ongoing fencing work at the earliest in order to ensure full-proof security along the Indo-Bangla border, reports Assam Tribune. The Chief Minister, who had a meeting with officials of law enforcement agencies and representatives from construction companies at Ambassa in Dhalai District, asked the BSF to ensure speedy completion of fencing work along the border. According to intelligence inputs, insurgents are using these unfenced border areas to cross over the international border.

7) Another chota sardar bites the dust, Version 1 -- ACMA:

The ‘commander-in-chief' of the banned Adivasi Cobra Militants of Assam (ACMA) was arrested from Gossaigaon near his home in Kokrajhar District on May 24 following an attack on the vice-president of All-Adivasi Students' Association of Assam (AASAA), reports The Hindu. AASAA vice-president Inus Tuddu was seriously injured when suspected ACMA militants fired at him at Pakriguri in Kokrajhar District on May 23.

Here is more on the same Linky.
Version 2 -- UDLA:

Sentinel reports that Security Forces (SFs) arrested ‘commander-in-chief’ of United Democratic Liberation Army (UDLA), identified as Nandaram Reang, from the dense forest of Kundanala in South Hailakandi District on May 16.

More on the same Linky.
Version 3 -- KLA:

Kanglaonline reports that a bullet ridden dead body of a man was found on May 8 under a culvert near Kholep village along Motbung stretch of National Highway 39 in Senapati District and has been identified on May 12 as Paokhomang Khongsai (37), the ‘President’ of the Kuki Liberation Army (KLA), a signatory of the Suspension of Operation (SoO). The motive behind the killing is yet to be ascertained as no individual or organisation has claimed responsible for the killing so far.

Version 4 -- KCP-MC:

Sangai Express reports on May 10 that ‘commander-in-chief’ of Kangleipak Communist Party-Military Council (KCP-MC), identified as Nongthombam Anand alias Malemnganba (36), was arrested from Bangalore on May 5 following investigations into the seizure of 200 kilograms ephedirine worth INR 20 million from an alleged KCP-MC militant on April 1. He was working with one Robindro as a trade partner who was operating from Karnataka. A laptop, seven mobile phones, pen drives, internet broadband connection and documents, threat e-mails and extortion letters related to KCP-MC have been recovered.

Version 5 -- RVA:

The ‘commander-in-chief’ of Rabha Viper Army, Sunil Rabha alias Chinese, was arrested for the third time by Security Forces (SFs) in Goalpara District, reports Telegraph. Rabha, who was involved in number of killings, abductions and extortion in Goalpara and part of Kamrup Districts, including abduction of a railway official from Dudhnoi in 2010, was arrested twice within a span of two years. Intelligence sources in Goalpara said the Rabha Viper Army was active on the Assam-Meghalaya border and was involved in abduction and extortion. The outfit is most potent organisation at the grassroots level, which provides logistic support to both United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) and the National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB) and keep liaison with the Garo National Army (GNLA) of Meghalaya.

More here: Linky.
Version 6 -- UTLA:

Kanglaonline reports that Security Forces (SFs) arrested at least seven militants including the ‘Commander-in-Chief’ (CIC) of the proscribed United Tribal Liberation Army (UTLA) from separate counter insurgency operations launched in different parts of Manipur. SFs on April 27 arrested three militants of Max faction of UTLA, including its CIC, during an operation launched near Kaimai village of Tamenglong District. The arrestees were identified as CIC of the outfit Ngurkhabo alias Max (23), Lunminthang (20) and Lulun (18). The SFs recovered eight packages of explosives, two detonators and a five meters long cordex from their possession.

Version 7 -- DNDF: Linky

A Dimasa rebel group is ready to lay down arms in a formal ceremony in Haflong after the period of the electoral code of conduct is over with the counting of the votes on May 13. A senior police official in Haflong last night said the Dima National Democratic Front, a 50-cadre gang, will surrender soon.
...
Sources in the Dima Hasao district police said the outfit got a big blow when its self-styled commander-in-chief Bihari Dimasa, 27, was recently gunned down by combined troops of the security forces and police during an encounter in the Dihangi area near Haflong. The rebels got another jolt on February 9 when the outfit’s chairman, Bidyalal Sengiyong, along with his two comrades in arms surrendered to district deputy commissioner Dilip Kumar Borthakur.

8) Sindh for Sikkim: Linky

Sikkim chief minister Pawan Chamling today iterated his demand that word ‘Sindh’ be replaced with ‘Sikkim’ in the national anthem to promote a sense of emotional integration, a suggestion endorsed on the spot by the governor, B.P. Singh.

9) HPC(D) talks: Linky

The maiden round of peace talks with the Hmar militant group, HPC (Democratic), slated to be held next month, is under the cloud with the Mizoram government firm on its stand that it will not accept an American missionary of Hmar origin as part of the group’s delegation. Mizoram chief minister Lalthanhawla had made it clear in the Assembly on March 28 that the presence of an American citizen in the official-level peace talks was “simply unacceptable”. The announcement followed reports that Reverend Rochunga Pudaite, an American citizen based in Wheaton, Illinois, had been nominated as a member of the HPC (D) delegation for the proposed peace talks.

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Review of "Drug Lord" by Terrence E. Poppa

"Drug Lord" is a book by Terrence Poppa, a news reporter with the El Paso Herald-Post, and hence a keen and biased eye on the drug trafficking business based out of the Tex-Mex border. The book is published by the Cinco Puntos Press, a neo-independent publishing group based out of El Paso. In some sense, this is a book out of line with normal discourse by the mainstream media, but yet biased in its own sense.

The book details how the Plaza system and drug trafficking business works in Mexico. Basically, the impression one gets after reading this book is that the establishment is not against drug trafficking to the U.S. as long as the Judges, the police (which is subservient to the Judiciary unlike the Anglo-sphere where the police is subservient to the Executive), the military and the politicians get their "cut" from the drug trafficking chief in return for protection and umbrage. The drug trafficking chief in return barters this umbrage to raise finances to pay the dues by sub-leasing and charging anyone who ships drugs through his territory. It is a game of cat and mouse where the establishment is trying to figure out how much drugs go through its territory and hence figuring out how much is owed, whereas the drug trafficking chief and his minions are trying to hide so that they have to pay less.

This equilibrium lasts till the drug trafficking chief remains all powerful in enforcing his diktat on his minions and his "subjects." The moment he staggers around showing a perceived lack of control is the moment the search for a successor begins. Sometimes the search is a short stop to the next best in the pipeline -- who could have already greased the palms of the establishment while working as an underling to the chief. Sometimes it is a wait till Aurangzeb establishes himself and develops the balls to tell the establishment it is he who will be the next in line. Thus, the book is a tale of transfer of power from Domingo Aranda to Manuel Carrasco to Shorty Lopez to Pablo Acosta. It is a tale of rivalries between Aranda and Carrasco, Carrasco and Lopez, Fermin Arevalo and Acosta, and so on. It is a tale of honorary "gringo" drug conduits such as Sammy Garcia and after his departure, his wife Becky Garcia. It is also a tale of the freelancing Marc de Horo who is needed to keep the Acosta system in check. It is a tale of how Hispanic American citizens such as Pablo Acosta could and can still keep one leg on either side of the Rio Grande and still get away with it. Overall, if you liked Scarface or Goodfellas or would like to scratch the soft underbelly of the U.S., this is a book to get hold of.

The book does not go much into the politics of Mexico, which in itself is a very riveting affair. One remark that gets mentioned is the following: "The political system kept itself going by allowing opposition parties to form and compete for power, but it rigged elections so that the official party candidate always won. The aim was to burn up the energy and resources of opponents in fruitless campaigns yet gain the appearance of democratic legitimacy by holding elections." This is exactly the strategy of monopolies, whether it is Google (see Siva Vaidhyanathan's recent book) or Lee Kuan Yew's party in Singapore or the leftist/socialist regimes of different shades of red or the U.S. for that matter in terms of foreign policy.

In the Indian context where pure monopolies are a bit hard to spot (not because they do not exist, but only because we do not care to identify them as such), some lessons can be gleaned too. For example, whenever someone vigorously questions and tirades at the "establishment," the establishment makes the dissenter a part of the establishment. Once in, they get a free run over their pet projects and let the establishment run riot in its slumber. In some sense, what we now know as dogmatic religiosity got to where it is by using the same system, whether it is the various stripes of Abrahamism or our very own Hinduism as we know it today. The underlying motto in life is that it is irrational to expect a rational and intelligent individual to cultivate competition; it is rational to expect the said individual to diffuse crises to further their own holds onto the status quo. This should make one commensurately appreciate dramatic changes against the tides of wisdom and common-sense.

The book is also a tale of American double standards and how the Mexicans (Messkins if you want to be even more politically neutral in this war) think of the gringos in a broad palette. It tells you how the customs and border police (CBP) could not care less as long as the drug-trade violence was limited to the Mexicans and to the other side of the Rio Grande, how new and used cars from Texas and California end up in Mexico where they are used by everyone including the Police and the Press with noone caring as to who the cars originally belonged to, how the Mexicans think of the drug trade as a sweet comeuppance to losing Texas to the gringos, how the American politicians asked the CBP to shut up as long as the NAFTA was being pursued (it got signed in the early days of the Bill Clinton Presidency), etc. It also tells how illegal and unofficial trade has always been a part of the Tex-Mex border -- in the Prohibition era, it was bootleg liquor and sotol (a potent cactus moonshine), in the World War II era, it was the red light districts of Mexico, post-War period which saw the emergence of heroin, the anti-establishment phase in the U.S. that got hooked to marijuana-induced trance, the emergence of Mexico as a trans-shipment route for cocaine replacing Florida as the preferred trans-shipment route for Colombian drug traffickers, while the post-Plan Colombia phase has seen the emergence of coyotes and human trafficking.

In terms of lessons to be learned by Indians, especially in the light of the porous Indo-Bangladesh border, unless the system as a whole (from top to bottom) gets serious in preventing illegal human trafficking, someone will find it easy and profitable to subvert the checks and controls. In other words, from a game theoretic viewpoint, in contrast to a major engineering disaster which is built on the failure of multiple minor cogs in the wheel or a terrorist network that shows "small-world" behavior and can hence be breached by disrupting the hubs, illegal trade is built on the failure of only one critical cog which makes failure an inevitable possibility. Thus, like Southern California, New Mexico, parts of Texas, Arizona, etc. continue to turn Hispanic forcing the gringos to retreat to other gentrified surroundings far away, so too will West Bengal and Assam turn Islamist forcing the Hindus to flee the border districts. Unless, a game-changer is established.

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